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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mr. Brown appeals following his conditional guilty pleas to the charges of
voluntary manslaughter and accessory after the fact to grand theft, from which he
reserved the right to appeal the denial of all pre-trial motions.

On appeal, Mr. Brown

asserts that the district court erred when it denied a number of those motions, and that
the district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the presentation of
evidence at the hearing held on his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion, and denied the motion without considering the new information he provided in
support of the motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case arose out of a complicated relationship between Mr. Brown, his thenwife, Tyrah, and a man named Leslie Breaw, whose disappearance and death resulted
in the criminal charges brought against Mr. Brown. At some point prior to his death,
Mr. Breaw raped Tyrah.

(Tr., p.275, L.15 - p.277, L.21 (both parties stipulating that

Mr. Breaw raped Tyrah Brown during a trip to Montana, and that the jury would be so
informed).) Following his preliminary hearing, Mr. Brown was charged with murder in
the first degree and grand theft. (R., pp.184-86.)
Defense counsel filed a number of pre-trial motions, most of which were denied. 1

(See generally R. and Miscellaneous Exhibits; see also Tr., p.379, L.7 - p.395, L.15.)

1 The district court granted a Motion for Change of Venue (R., pp.768, 776), declined to
issue a pre-trial ruling on a Motion to Exclude Confidential Communications (R., pp.85253; Tr., p.333, L.17 - p.334, L.7), and did not rule on a Motion in Limine re: Photos of
Victim. (Tr., p.310, Ls.8-13.) Three other motions filed by Mr. Brown's previous
attorneys: a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained from Search Warrant Issued

1

Following mediation, Mr. Brown and the State agreed to a plea bargain on the following
terms:
Mr. Brown will have an opportunity to present three additional motions - or
basically it's one motion to suppress with three independent grounds. He
will - the State will amend the [murder] charge to voluntary manslaughter,
and the grand theft charge will be amended to accessory to a grand theft
after the fact. Mr. Brown will enter Alforde] pleas to both charges and
reserve his appellate rights in writing to challenge all pretrial motions.
The sentences - the State would agree to have sentences on both
charges run concurrently and that we would enter into a Rule 11
agreement with you, Your Honor, that you would agree that any sentence
imposed would run concurrently on both charges. Other than that, there
would be open recommendations.
The State has indicated it will
recommend a fixed 15-year term [on the manslaughter charge].
(Tr., p.377, L.13 - p.379, L.6; R., p.900 (reserving right to appeal from "[t]he denial of all
of the Defendant's pretrial motions").)
Following the denial of the remaining motion to suppress, Mr. Brown entered

Alford pleas to the two reduced charges.

(Tr., p.395, L.14 - p.405, L.16.)

At the

sentencing hearing, the State requested that the district court impose the maximum
sentences of fifteen years on the voluntary manslaughter charge and five years on the
accessory to grand theft charge, to run concurrently.

(Tr., p.436, L.5 - p.437, L.21.)

March 22, 2007, (R., pp.295-96), a Motion to Suppress Confessions (R., pp.269-70),
and a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained from Welfare Check on February 7, 2007
(R., pp.275-76), were not ruled upon. Additionally, Mr. Brown filed a number of pro se
motions (see generally R. and Exhibit Volumes 1-9), which the district court declined to
consider. (Tr., p.42, Ls.11-20 ("[A]s long as you have counsel, the motions that we'll
hear will be the ones that are presented by counsel.").) Because all of the foregoing
were either granted or were not decided they are not subject to appeal under the terms
of the plea agreement. Two additional motions, a Motion to Dismiss Based on
Spoliation of Evidence (R., pp.273-74), and a Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained
from a Search Warrant Issued on February 7, 2007 (R., pp.293-94), are not being
pursued on appeal, despite having been denied by the district court. (Tr., p.61, Ls.3-5;
R., pp.886-87.) A Motion to Allow View of Premises by Jury which was conditionally
denied, with leave to re-raise it at trial, is also not being pursued on appeal.
(R., pp.847-48, 895.)
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2

Defense counsel requested either a unified sentence of twelve years, with six years
fixed, or a ten year fixed sentence, suspended in favor of probation, with a condition of
probation being one year of local jail time. 3 (Tr., p.444, Ls.5-10.) Ultimately, the district
court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with ten years fixed, on the voluntary
manslaughter charge, and a concurrent, fixed sentence of five years on the accessory
charge. (Tr., p.452, L.14 - p.453, L.5.)
Mr. Brown filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
(R., p.959.)

Mr. Brown then filed a Rule 35 motion, requesting reduction of the

sentences imposed, and requesting a hearing on the motion.

4

(R., pp.965-68.)

Mr. Brown also filed a document entitled, "Reasons to Ameliorate the Sentence
Imposed,,5 which appears to have been at one point attached to his pro se Rule 35
motion. 6 The district court held a hearing on the Rule 35 motion, but refused to allow
Mr. Brown to testify and refused to allow defense counsel to present any witnesses in
support of the Rule 35 motion, concluding:

Since the accessory to grand theft charge carries a maximum sentence of five years,
defense counsel was presumably only requesting a sentence on the manslaughter
charge.
4 Defense counsel also filed a Rule 35 motion, dated December 17, 2010, and filestamped as entered on December 17, 2010. (R., p.971.) Mr. Brown's pro se Rule 35
motion is dated December 15, 2010, and file-stamped as entered on December 20,
2010. (R., p.965.)
5 This document begins in Volume 8 of the nine volumes prepared in response to
Mr. Brown's objection to the record, and its attachments appear to continue into Volume
9.
6 Mr. Brown's pro se Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35, is filestamped as having been entered on December 20, 2010 at 12:32 p.m., while the
Reasons to Ameliorate the Sentence Imposed was file-stamped as having been entered
one minute earlier. (R., p.965; Reasons to Ameliorate the Sentence Imposed, p.3.)
Furthermore, the pro se Rule 35 motion consists of two pages, one of which references
an attached statement that "would call for some form of amelioration of the sentence
imposed, for the reasons given herein" (R., p.966), while the first page of the document
entitled Reasons to Ameliorate the Sentence Imposed is numbered as page 3.
(Reasons to Ameliorate the Sentence Imposed, p.3.)
3

3

The request for additional evidence is discretionary with the Court. When
I think back on the case and we had a number of hearings in Sandpoint,
pretrial hearings, Mr. Brown was quite prolific in his written documents
submitted to the Court[7] and to everyone else. We had a mediation, a
plea, Alford plea, after the mediation. We had the presentence report
prepared and had the sentencing hearing with the full opportunity to call
any witnesses who might have something relevant to say at the
sentencing hearing.
It doesn't seem to me that - that there is much to be gained here by
calling a pathologist, a firearms expert, and a polygrapher. And as far as
those - any testimony from those people would go to the - seems to me
would go to issues of guilt, innocence or guilt, and that was taken care of
when we took the plea.
And as far as Mr. Brown is concerned, he had the opportunity, as I stated,
and he submitted reams and reams of written material.[8] So I think that
anything he's had to present to the Court has been presented. So I'm
going to exercise my discretion and deny the request for additional [sic]
testimony.
(Supp.Tr} p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.17.) Ultimately, the district court denied the Rule 35
motion, concluding, "in looking back on it and thinking about all that was presented back
at the time of sentencing and prior thereto, the sentence that I imposed, I think, is the
correct one. And I'm not going to modify that sentence." (Supp.Tr., p.13, Ls.14-1S.)

The district court is undoubtedly referring to the numerous pro se motions filed by
Mr. Brown which the district court previously announced that it would not consider.
~Tr., p.42, Ls.11-20.)
See note 4, supra.
9 References to the transcript of the Rule 35 hearing, prepared on May 1, 2012, will be
to "Supp.Tr."
7

4

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Exclude from
Evidence Defendant's Mail Correspondence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's motions to suppress
evidence obtained as a result of his arrest because material exculpatory
information discovered after the issuance of the arrest warrant undermined the
magistrate's probable cause finding?

3.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown's motion to suppress
statements obtained when he was incapable of intelligently and voluntarily
waiving his right to remain silent because the State failed to establish that his
statements were made voluntarily?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Brown's request to
present testimony at the hearing on his Rule 35 motion and denied his motion
without considering the new information he provided in support?

5.

Mindful of this Court's holding in State v. Manzanares, did the district court err
when it denied Mr. Brown's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Probable Cause at
Preliminary Hearing?

6.

Mindful of the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (c) in a state court prosecution, did the district court nevertheless
err when it denied Mr. Brown's motion to suppress statements obtained in
violation of those provisions?

5

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To Exclude From Evidence
Defendant's Mail Correspondence Obtained In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment

A.

Introduction
Defense counsel filed a Motion to Exclude from Evidence Defendant's Mail

Correspondence,lO which had been opened and copied over the three year period
during which Mr. Brown was subject to pre-trial detention. In that motion, he requested
exclusion of "all correspondence from Mr. Brown while in custody at the Bonner County
Jail," arguing "that the Defendant has a right as a pretrial detainee to communicate, and
the

prosecutor's

direction

to

jail

staff

to

photocopy

Mr.

Brown's

writings

unconstitutionally infringes his right to privacy and to freely communicate." (R., pp.85455.)
At the hearing on Mr. Brown's Motion to Exclude from Evidence Defendant's Mail
Correspondence, defense counsel argued,
He has certain rights that apply as a pretrial detainee that would be
different from some other inmate who's merely in custody.

[I]n this case there is a large body of evidence disclosed by the State
which is every piece of mail Mr. Brown has written over the last three
years. Such surveillance of his communications is beyond the security
interests of the facility. Simply being able to review, check, inspect
10 Defense counsel
also filed a Motion In Limine to Exclude Confidential
Communications (R., pp.852-53), concerning letters sent by Mr. Brown to his then-wife.
The district court declined to rule on that motion "at this point," explaining that it would
consider objections on an item-by-item basis at trial. (Tr., p.333, L.17 - p.334, L.7.)
While Mr. Brown does not pursue that undecided motion on appeal, he does note that
such letters fall within his Motion to Exclude from Evidence Defendant's Mail
Correspondence. Obviously, if this matter is returned to the district court for a trial,
Mr. Brown would retain the ability to challenge the admission of confidential
communications with his then-wife.

6

outgoing inmate mail to determine whether or not there's a security
violation or security threat is far different than photocopying each and
every piece of mail, providing that to the detectives, and providing that to
the prosecuting attorney as evidence in a homicide. It's beyond the
scope, I think, of what the purpose for allowing the State to invade his
freedom to communicate and his constitutional right to privacy in his
communications with others.
Opening and inspecting his mail and
photocopying it for content pertaining to each and every statement he
makes is simply violative of the constitutional right to privacy as well as his
First Amendment right to communicate.
(Tr., p.365, L.7 - p.366, L.10.) Defense counsel later clarified the scope of the motion,
arguing that it was based on "a violation of Fourth Amendment and First Amendment
rights .... ,,11 (Tr., p.367, Ls.24-25.)
The State acknowledged that the jail's practice involved "copying all of his
nonlegal mail."

(Tr., p.366, Ls.16-17.)

The State then argued that its wholesale

opening and copying of Mr. Brown's mail was appropriate because: (1) he had a history
of identity theft, (2) he has sent out materials in violation of jail rules, including to his
wife, a fellow inmate, (3) he was communicating "with persons associated with other
persons charged with violent crimes," (4) he communicated with a convicted child
molester about attempting to obtain state and federal relief, and (5) he was using
visitors and jail chaplains "to violate communications orders .... " (Tr., p.368, L.3 p.370, L.25.) The State, however, presented no evidence in support of its arguments
supporting the wholesale surveillance of Mr. Brown's outgoing mail.
Ultimately, the district court denied the motion on three grounds:

(1) that

probable cause is probably not required to monitor mail in the way that the jail did; (2)
"to the extent that probable cause was required for implementation of the jail policy with
respect particularly to Mr. Brown, that probable cause did exist"; and (3) "the policy

11

Mr. Brown does not pursue the First Amendment claim on appeal.

7

passes constitutional muster." (Tr., p.371, L.21 - p.372, L.19.) In making its ruling, the
district court assumed the existence of a jail policy when no evidence was presented of
such a policy in place. (Tr., p.371, L.25 - p.372, L.6) ("[I]t sounds like there was a policy
in effect for the Bonner County jail regarding communications from prisoners and that
there really is no right to privacy, at least of the nature asserted here, to
communications which would be in violation of jail rules. The attack here seems to be
on the jail policy of monitoring mail.").
Mr. Brown asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion because
he established that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the jail opened
and photocopied all of his non-legal, outgoing mail without presenting evidence that
such activities were conducted pursuant to a search warrant or a recognized exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To Exclude From
Evidence Defendant's Mail Correspondence Obtained In Violation Of The Fourth
Amendment
The Fourth Amendment, in relevant part, provides, ''The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This provision has
been held to protect a person's "legitimate expectations of privacy against intrusion by
the government." State v. Morris, 131 Idaho 562, 565 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing, inter alia,
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). "Warrantless searches are presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment." State v. Foster,
127 Idaho 723, 726 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations omitted).
When a defendant challenges a warrantless search or seizure, the burden is on
the State to establish that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement justifies

8

State v. Woolery,

the search or seizure.

116 Idaho 368, 370 (1989) (citing

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), State v. HalWick, 94 Idaho 615 (1972),
and State v. Curtis, 106 Idaho 483 (Ct. App. 1984». Even when the State proves the
existence of an exception to the warrant requirement, the search or seizure '''must still
be reasonable in light of all of the other surrounding circumstances.'" State v. Diaz, 144
Idaho 300, 302 (2007) (quoting Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002».

In United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371 (9 th Cir. 1973), the Ninth Circuit
considered whether Savage's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when, while in
custody prior to trial, a letter he mailed was opened and photocopied by his jailers (and
ultimately admitted in the government's case against him at trial). In concluding that the
letter was unconstitutionally obtained, the Court announced, "absent a showing of some
justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison security the interception and photocopying
of the letter was violative of the fourth amendment and the letter should have been
excluded as evidence."12 Id. at 1373.

In United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403 (9 th Cir. 1981), receded from on other
grounds by United States

V.

Goseyun, 789 F.2d 1386, 1387 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam),

the Court considered the denial of a motion to suppress the contents of a sealed letter
taken from the cell of an inmate during a warrantless search.

The search occurred

"during a cell-by-cell search which was prompted by a tip that an escape plan was
underway."

Id. at 406.

The Court began its analysis by explaining that while "[a]

prisoner's fourth amendment rights are extremely limited ... a prison inmate does have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a sealed letter." Id. (citing Lanza
370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962), and United States

V.

V.

New York,

Savage, 482 F.2d 1371,1373 (9 th Cir.

12 The Court ultimately found the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
9

1973)). Recognizing that the "warrantless seizure of a sealed letter from a prisoner's
cell therefore violates the fourth amendment, unless it serves a justifiable purpose of
imprisonment or prison security," the Court concluded that the motion to suppress was
properly denied because
[The] letter was discovered during a search conducted according to prison
regulations which allowed security searches "to detect contraband,
prevent escapes, maintain sanitary standards and to eliminate fire and
safety hazards." This rule is reasonably designed to promote prison
security, a legitimate government purpose. There is no indication that the
search went further than necessary to effect its purpose.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
In Mr. Brown's case, the State presented no evidence to meet its burden to prove
an exception to the warrant requirement justifying its actions in seizing, searching, and
copying all of his outgoing, non-legal mail, items in which he enjoyed a reasonable
expectation of privacy.

Additionally, the district court appears to have erroneously

believed that Mr. Brown enjoyed no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
his outgoing, non-legal mail, and, therefore, did not rule that an exception to the warrant
requirement applied, relied on a non-existent jail policy to justify its holding, and to the
extent that the district court believed that some general jail exception to the warrant
requirement existed, it was legally incorrect. Finally, to the extent that some exception
to the warrant requirement did apply to the State's conduct, the State failed to show that
seizing, searching, and copying all of Mr. Brown's outgoing, non-legal mail was
reasonable in light of the circumstances in his case.
Because Mr. Brown entered a conditional guilty plea, the proper remedy upon a
finding of error is for this Court to remand this matter to the district court for entry of an
order excluding his mail correspondence, and to conduct an inquiry as to whether
Mr. Brown wishes to withdraw his guilty pleas.
10

See I.C.R. 11 (a)(2) ("If the defendant

prevails on appeal [from a conditional guilty plea], the defendant shall be allowed to
withdraw defendant's plea.").

II.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Brown's Motions To Suppress Obtained As The
Result Of His Arrest Because The Material Exculpatory Information Discovered After
The Issuance Of The Arrest Warrant Undermined The Magistrate's Probable Cause
Finding

A.

Introduction
Mr. Brown filed a motion for a Franks 13 hearing as to an arrest warrant issued for

a charge of grand theft of a debit card belonging to Mr. Breaw.14 In that motion, defense
counsel sought to "challenge the truthfulness of certain statements in the testimony of
Detective Tony Ingram of the Bonner County Sheriff's Office, and to challenge his
reckless omission of material eXCUlpatory evidence from the warrant testimony."
(Motion for Franks Hearing Regarding Warrants Issued in CR-07 _621 15 (hereinafter,
Motion for Franks Hearing), p.2.)

In the motion, Mr. Brown argued, inter alia, that

Detective Ingram failed to inform the magistrate of material changes to the facts
contained in his testimony in support of the arrest warrant prior to its execution, material
changes which would have resulted in the magistrate no longer possessing probable

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
14 The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide whether a Franks hearing is
available to challenge the issuance of an arrest warrant. State v. Pona, 926 A.2d 592,
612 n.18 (R.1. 2007) (so stating, and noting "that a fair number of courts confronted with
this issue have extended Franks also to include challenges to arrest warrants")
(citations omitted). It does not appear that the appellate courts of this state have ruled
on this issue.
15 This motion is in Volume 6 of the nine volumes prepared in response to Mr. Brown's
objection to the record.
13

11

cause to support the previously issued arrest warrant. 16 (Motion for Franks Hearing,
pp.2-9.)
Mr. Brown also filed a related Motion to Suppress Evidence for Lack of Probable
Cause in Case No. CR-07-621, arguing that there was insufficient probable cause to
support the charge of grand theft of the debit card belonging to Mr. Breaw, which
provided "insufficient evidence to support the filing of the Complaint against Mr. Brown
in CR-07-621," and therefore "insufficient reason and evidence to take Mr. Brown into
custody in Florida, to interrogate him, and to proceed with any search warrants."
(R., pp.277 -78.) In another motion to suppress statements made following his arrest
due to the dissipation of probable cause to arrest him, he argued that probable cause to
arrest him for crimes related to the financial transaction card dissipated when that card
was discovered on Mr. Breaw's body prior to his arrest and interrogation. (Motion to
Suppress: Presentment to Magistrate; Involuntary Confession; Dissipation of Probable
Cause; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress: Presentment to Magistrate;
Involuntary Confession; and Dissipation of Probable Cause, p.6.17) Because the three
motions sought the same remedy for the same reason: suppression of evidence
obtained as a result of Mr. Brown's arrest in Florida due to a lack of probable cause,
Mr. Brown relies on the same argument in appealing from the denial of all three
motions.
The following facts were developed in support of Mr. Brown's Franks motion and
the related motions to suppress. Detective Ingram appeared before a magistrate and

16 Mr. Brown also argued that the warrant was invalid because Detective Ingram failed
to conduct an adequate investigation prior to seeking the arrest warrant. Mr. Brown
does not renew that argument on appeal.
17 Both this motion and memorandum are in Volume 8 of the nine volumes prepared in
response to Mr. Brown's objection to the record.
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provided sworn testimony in support of the issuance of an arrest warrant 18 for Mr. Brown
for the crime of grand theft by possession of stolen property, specifically, a debit card
belonging to Mr. Breaw.

Detective Ingram testified that his investigation began on

February 5, 2007, when a truck belonging to Mr. Breaw was discovered in a snow bank,
having been abandoned there for at least a week. The keys were with the truck, as
were several other items, including a checkbook, legal papers, several pieces of mail,
and Mr. Breaw's wallet, containing his Montana driver's license.

No financial

transaction cards were found. Police suspected that Mr. Breaw may have walked into
the woods to commit suicide. Due to the presence of two to four feet of snow on the
ground, they were only able to conduct a limited search of the woods near the truck,
after which they decided to go to Mr. Breaw's residence to see if he had gone home and
not yet returned for his truck. It was then that they discovered that Mr. Breaw's house
was one-quarter of a mile from the location of his truck (three-quarters of a mile by
road). Once they realized how close Mr. Breaw's house was to the location of his truck,
combined with the large number of empty beer cans in the bed of the truck, they began
to suspect that Mr. Breaw "may have been intoxicated and ran off the road and in an
attempt to try to walk home made the wrong turn and he had stumbled off into a path."
(Transcript of Probable Cause for Search Warrant Hearing 19 (hereinafter, P.C.Tr., p.3,
L.15-p.9, L.13.)

18 Detective Ingram also sought - and received - search warrants for the Brown and
Breaw residences at the same hearing and based on the same testimony.
19 This transcript is contained in Volume 6 of the nine volumes of exhibits prepared in
response to Mr. Brown's objection to the record. The district court took judicial notice of
this transcript for purposes of both the Franks hearing and a hearing on the motion to
suppress items obtained via the search warrant issued on February 6, 2007.
(Tr., p.255, L.18 - p.256, L.11.)
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Police then conducted a welfare check at Mr. Breaw's property. They entered
one of two houses on the property, 525 Scranton, noticed paperwork with the Browns'
names on it, and "realized we were in the wrong location." They then went next door to
514 Scranton and found items indicating that it was Mr. Breaw's residence. Police later
learned that the Browns and Mr. Brown's mother-in-law, Rebekka Harding, resided
together at 525 Scranton. Police noticed no evidence of fresh traffic in the driveway
area of either of the two houses. A neighbor told police that the neighbor had not seen
Mr. Breaw for approximately two weeks and had last seen the Browns on approximately
January 25, 2007, "packing in a very hurriedly [sic] manner and that basically the only
thing they were taking were clothes."

Having been inside both houses, Detective

Ingram concluded that "all indications" were that the Browns and Mr. Breaw "had just
stepped out and planned to return." (P.C.Tr., p.9, L.13 - p.12, L.16.)
Detective Ingram contacted Mr. Breaw's mother, who lives In Sacramento,
California, who told him that she had last spoken with her son by telephone on either
January 14 or 15. He had told her that he would call her the next day to discuss plans
to meet with her in Oregon. He also learned that Mr. Breaw's dogs had been picked up
by animal control because they were reported as abandoned, were "starving and had no
food." A review of Mr. Breaw's bank records showed that his financial transaction cards
were last used on January 25, 2007, and that one check, along with the carbon copy,
was missing from his checkbook and had not been cashed.

Detective Ingram also

discovered that, on January 18, 2007, someone who looked like Mr. Brown used
Mr. Breaw's debit card at Mac's, a nearby gas station.
L.21.)
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(P.C.Tr., p.12, L.17 - p.15,

In researching the backgrounds of the Browns, Detective Ingram learned that
they "both have an extensive criminal history," including an arrest of both for identity
theft eight months earlier, and a bank account with a fake name purportedly established
by Mr. Brown.

Mrs. Brown's parole officer described Mr. Brown as having "a very

extensive reputation with them to be a hard-core person, I guess" and "that she had no
doubt that Mr. Brown would be - would be capable of anything at this point involving
money." He also learned that neither of the Browns had picked up their most recent
paychecks, and that Mr. Brown had been employed by Mr. Breaw. (P.C.Tr., p.16, L.18
- p.20, L.14.)
Detective Ingram then testified that Mr. Breaw's abandoned truck was first
noticed on January 20, 2007, and "[t]he only physical person that actually can verify
contact with Mr. Breaw would be his mother either on the 14th or 15th [of January]. All
the other store owners would vaguely give that it had been a couple weeks since they
saw him. Nobody was actually able to pinpoint an exact day." He also noted that the
most recent postmark on the mail in the truck was January 18, 2007, which was the
same date that a person matching Mr. Brown's description was seen using Mr. Breaw's
debit card. In speaking with one of Mrs. Brown's co-workers, Pam, Detective Ingram
learned that Mrs. Brown had said "that around the 24th, [she] made a comment to her
that they were gonna take Mr. Breaw to the airport in Seattle and he was going to fly to
Thailand to pick up a sailboat." A different co-worker told Pam "that they [sic] overheard
Tyrah having a phone conversation in which Tyrah was telling an unknown person on
the phone that they were actually going to drive Mr. Breaw to Oregon." Having found
Mr. Breaw's wallet, car keys, and passport in his car, along with his dogs, that he took
with him everywhere he went, running wild, Detective Ingram concluded that "whatever
15

happened to him it was quick and sudden." (P.C.Tr., p.20, L.15 - p.23, L.7.) He also
spoke to "several locations that said [Mr. Breaw] stopped by on a daily [basis]. And
then approximately at least two weeks ago it just stopped." (P.C.Tr., p.24, Ls.20-22.)
He noted that the crimes under investigation "at this point would be "taking a
transaction card with intent to defraud [which] constitutes grand theft as well as the
specific crime for fraudulent use."20 (P.C.Tr., p.23, L.15 - p.27, L.16.) After Detective
Ingram finished testifying, the State requested, in addition to a search warrant for both
residences, an arrest warrant for Mr. Brown for "possession [of a financial transaction
card] with intent to defraud." (P.C.Tr., p.29, Ls.8-18.)
In granting the requests for the search warrants and the arrest warrant, the
district court explained,
I do find probable cause to believe that they're [the Browns] involved in the
crime of fraudulent use of a financial transaction card or grand theft. Also
have very significant concerns about what is [sic] happened to Mr. Leslie
Breaw. But at this point that's - that's unknown. The abandoned car, the
abandoned personal effects, someone who is very close to two dogs and I
mean the dogs being found unfed and running loose.
In any event I believe there is probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant to search for the items listed on Pages 1 and 2 of the warrant.
And I also believe based on what we've heard about Mr. Brown using that
debit card at the Mac's stations, [in] Priest River, that there is probable
cause to charge him with the felony crime of fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card to issue a criminal complaint and arrest warrant.
(P.C.Tr., p.30, Ls.3-19.)
On February 7,2007, a state warrant was issued for the arrest of Mr. Brown on a
charge of grand theft, based on a felony criminal complaint accusing Mr. Brown of grand
theft by possession of stolen property alleged to have been committed as follows, "That
the Defendant, Keith Brown, on or before the 18th day of January, 2007, in the County
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of Bonner, State of Idaho, did obtain or possess stolen property to wit: a Panhandle
State Bank debit card belonging to Leslie Breaw with the intent to appropriate to himself
said property." These two documents provided the basis upon which a federal warrant
for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution was issued. (Defendant's Exhibit B.)
On March 19, 2007, a body later identified as Leslie Breaw's was discovered,
with the financial transaction card at issue found on the body shortly after it was
discovered.

(Ingram Deposition, p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.14.) Detective Ingram testified

that he had informed the prosecuting attorney of this new information but did not return
to the issuing magistrate with it because "decisions involving a judge are his [the
prosecuting attorney's], not mine." (Ingram Deposition, p.65, LS.17 -23.) Mr. Brown was
arrested in Florida on the federal fugitive warrant on March 20, 2007 at 12:30 p.m.
(likely Eastern Standard Time). As of 1: 12 p.m. (likely Pacific Standard Time) on March
20, 2007, Leslie Breaw's body had not been identified by the medical examiner.
(Tr., p.214, L.20 - p.218, L.2, p.245, Ls.4-11.)
In rejecting Mr. Brown's argument that, had the police returned to the issuing
magistrate upon learning material exculpatory information prior to the service of the
arrest warrant, the magistrate would have lacked probable cause for the warrant to
remain in effect, the district court explained,
[I]f all of the facts, both exculpatory and incupatory [sic], known to police at
[the time of] defendant's arrest, albeit unknown to Ingram at the time fo the
warrant hearing, had been presented to the magistrate, she would no
doubt have sustained her determination that there was probable cause to
arrest defendant for grand theft, as explained in greater detail in the next
section.

20 Most of Detective Ingram's testimony on these points consisted of answering
"[c]orrect" to leading questions posed by the prosecuting attorney.
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(Opinion and Order Re: Motions to Suppress, p.7.) In the next section, the district court
reasoned, "Even if defendant had shown that the arrest warrant was invalid, the
evidence obtained because of defendant's arrest should not be suppressed because, at
the time defendant was arrested, police had probable cause to arrest him without a
warrant." (Opinion and Order Re: Motions to Suppress, p.8 (citing Whiteley v. Warden
of Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971) and United States v. Rose, 541
F.2d 750 (8 th Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original)).

B.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Brown's Motions To Suppress
Obtained As The Result Of His Arrest Because The Material Exculpatory
Information Discovered After The Issuance Of The Arrest Warrant Undermined
The Magistrate's Probable Cause Finding
Mr. Brown asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that the

magistrate's probable cause finding would not have been different had she been
informed of the material eXCUlpatory information learned after the issuance of the
warrant but before its execution, and when it concluded that, even if Mr. Brown had
established the invalidity of the arrest warrant, the evidence obtained as a result of his
arrest in Florida "should not be suppressed because, at the time [he] was arrested,
police had probable cause" to conduct a warrantless arrest.

Had the arrest warrant

been invalidated prior to its execution, Mr. Brown would not have been arrested in
Florida and would not have made inculpatory statements.
In Franks, the United States Supreme Court held that when a defendant
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a law enforcement officer
knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth made a false statement
in support of the issuance of a search warrant, the trial court is required to reconsider
the issue of probable cause with that false information excised. Upon doing so, if the
18

remaining information is insufficient to establish probable cause, the court must void the
search warrant and exclude the fruits of the search conducted under the warrant.
Franks, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Franks has been adopted by this Court. See
State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41 (1979). The Franks doctrine has been expanded in
this State to apply "not only to affirmative falsehoods in a warrant application but also to
a deliberate or reckless omission of material exculpatory information."

State v.

Rounsville, 136 Idaho 869 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted). A number of courts have
extended the Franks rationale to material eXCUlpatory information learned after the
issuance of the warrant but before its execution. See United States v. Marin-Buitrago,
734 F.2d 889 (2 nd Cir. 1984), United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 932 (6 th Cir.
1990), and United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735 (5 th Cir. 2007) (applying Bowling and
Marin-Buitrago).21
In Marin-Buitrago, the Second Circuit considered whether new information
potentially casting doubt on probable cause, obtained after the issuance of a search
warrant but prior to its execution, invalidated the warrant. As an initial matter, the Court
held, relying on Franks, that "when a definite and material change has occurred in the
facts underlying the magistrate's determination of probable cause, it is the magistrate,
not the executing officers, who must determine whether probable cause still exists.
Therefore, the magistrate must be made aware of any material new or correcting
information." Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d at 894 (emphasis in original). The Court then
analyzed the information presented at the time of the issuance of the warrant along with

These cases all concerned search warrants, but there is no reason that an arrest
warrant, authorizing the seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment, should be
dealt with any differently than a warrant authorizing the search of premises under the
Fourth Amendment.
21

19

the new information to assess whether probable cause still existed.

Ultimately, the

Court concluded that the new information did not affect the existence of probable cause.
Id. at 895-96.

The Bowling Court, relying on the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), in which the Court had held, with respect to a

warrantless search, "when the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of
search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
government enforcement agent," held that it is "equally applicable to cases in which
officers possess a warrant but are alerted to circumstances which affect the probable
cause for its execution." Id. at 933. This is because the Fourth Amendment requires
that probable cause exist both at the time that a warrant is issued and at the time the
warrant is executed. Id. at 932.
At his Franks hearing, Mr. Brown established that, after the issuance of the arrest
warrant but before it was executed, the police learned material information, not provided
to the magistrate, calling into question whether probable cause to arrest Mr. Brown for
theft of the financial transaction card still existed. Specifically, Detective Ingram learned
that several people had seen Mr. Breaw alive in the days following Mr. Brown's
suspected use of the debit card, including one person who saw Mr. Breaw use the debit
card at issue, another witness who told Detective Ingram that Mr. Breaw had authorized
Mr. Brown to use the debit card to purchase gas, and that the debit card was found on
Mr. Breaw's body.
Detective Ingram testified that the day after the warrant hearing, he interviewed
several local business owners and Rebekka Harding, Mrs. Brown's mother. Pat Aikin
told him that he may have seen Leslie Breaw on January 24, 2007, but "was not 100
20

percent sure." Ralph Ahlefeld, the owner of a local bakery, said that on January 20,
2007, he saw Mr. Breaw use the debit card that Mr. Brown was suspected of stealing
two days earlier.

Dan Mack, said that he last saw Mr. Breaw on January 22, 2007.

Finally, Mrs. Brown's mother, Ms. Harding told Detective Ingram that she had last seen
Mr. Breaw on January 25, 2007, and that Mr. Breaw had previously given Mr. Brown
permission to use his debit card to buy gas. 22 (Defendant's Exhibit D (Deposition of
Tony J. Ingram) (hereinafter, Ingram Deposition), p.26, L.22 - p.34, L.9.)

Detective

Ingram acknowledged passing all of this information along to the prosecuting attorney,
who responded by saying "that we would keep the warrant where it was."

(Ingram

Deposition, p.34, L.19 - p.36, L.15.) He also testified that he never went back before
the magistrate who issued the arrest warrant. (Ingram Deposition, p.36, Ls.2-4.)
Additionally, on March 19, 2007, after discovering Mr. Breaw's body but before
Mr. Brown was arrested on the warrant, police found the debit card at issue on the
body. (Ingram Deposition, p.63, L.25 - p.64, L.14.) Detective Ingram testified that he
informed the prosecuting attorney of the discovery of the debit card, but did not take that
information to the magistrate because "[t]he decisions involving a judge are his, not
mine."23 (Ingram Deposition, p.65, Ls.17-23.) He also testified that he did not seek a
warrant to arrest Mr. Brown for the murder of Mr. Breaw because he didn't have
probable cause to obtain such a warrant. (Ingram Deposition, p.67, LsA-15.)

22 Detective Ingram noted that he "didn't believe [Ms. Harding] one hundred percent."
(Ingram Deposition, p.35, L.25 - p.36, L.1.)
23 More troubling was Detective Ingram's recitation of what the prosecuting attorney told
him with respect to Ms. Harding's eXCUlpatory statement regarding Mr. Brown having
permission to use Mr. Breaw's debit card, specifically, "We do not have the word of the
victim. We don't know if that card was used or not, because our victim is no longer
around. So how can we take light of one person's word over our victim when the one
person we're talking to is a possible suspect in the disappearance of Mr. Breaw at the
time?" (Ingram Deposition, p.77, L.13 - p.78, L.2.)
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Mr. Brown asserts that, in light of the undisclosed material exculpatory
information learned after the issuance of the arrest warrant but before its execution, the
district court erred when it denied his Franks motion and his motions to suppress for
lack of probable cause with respect to the charge of grand theft by possession of a debit
card belonging to Mr. Breaw.24

III.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress Statements
Obtained When He Was Incapable Of Intelligently And Voluntarily Waiving His Right To
Remain Silent Because The State Failed To Establish That His Statements Were Made
Voluntarily
A.

Introduction
Mr. Brown asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion "to

suppress all statements made while he was in custody, and all evidence flowing from
those statements" on the basis that they were not made voluntarily because the State
failed to meet its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
statements were made voluntarily.

B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress
Statements Obtained When He Was Incapable Of Intelligently And Voluntarily
Waiving His Right To Remain Silent Because The State Failed To Establish That
His Statements Were Made Voluntarily
In order for a confession to be considered voluntary and constitutionally-

admissible under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, it must be "the

24 Because Mr. Brown maintains that there was no probable cause at the time he was
arrested on the warrant in Florida, he need not respond to the district court's alternative
holding that the Florida arrest could have been justified as a warrantless arrest based
on probable cause. It is worth noting, however, that the district court cited to no law in
support of its conclusion that a warrantless arrest for an out-of-state offense could have
been lawfully made by Florida officers.
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product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice," with the defendant's "capacity
for self-determination" not "critically impaired." Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602 (1961).

The choice to confess must be "freely self-determined."

Rogers v.

Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961), and be "the product of a rational intellect and a

free will."

Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960).

"The question of the

voluntariness of the defendant's statements must be resolved by examining the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the statements to determine whether it is the product
of a rational intellect and a free will."

State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 499 (1983)

(citations omitted).
"It is the state's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a
statement was voluntarily made." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928 (Ct. App. 1995)
(citation omitted).

In making such a determination, an appellate court considers the

totality of the circumstances, which may include "the characteristics of the accused as
well as the details of the interrogation, including whether Miranda warnings are given."
Id. (citations omitted).

Some of the circumstances that must be considered are: "1.

"Whether Miranda warnings were given; 2. The youth of the accused; 3. The accused's
level of education; 4. The length of the detention; 5. The repeated and prolonged nature
of the questioning; and 6. Deprivation of food or sleep." State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211,
214 (1993) (citing Scheckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).)
Mr. Brown filed a motion to suppress statements obtained when he was
incapable of making an intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent.
(Motion to Suppress: Presentment to Magistrate; Involuntary Confession; Dissipation of
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Probable Cause?5) In that motion, he argued that his statements to law enforcement
must be suppressed because he was incapable of intelligently and voluntarily waiving
his right to remain silent because he was of unsound mind when the statements were
made and was not competent to make any statements. (ld., p.2.) At the hearing on the
motion, defense counsel described the issue as "whether or not the confession was
voluntary." (Tr., p.382, Ls.4-5.)
In support of his motion, Mr. Brown cited to the district court's Amended Order of
Commitment (Motion to Suppress: Presentment to Magistrate; Involuntary Confession;
Dissipation of Probable Cause, p.2), in which the district court found Mr. Brown "unfit to
proceed or to assist in his defense, lacks the capacity to make an informed decision
regarding treatment of his mental illness, and is dangerously mentally ill as defined in
Idaho Code 66-1305."

As a result of these findings, the district court ordered that

proceedings against Mr. Brown be suspended "until such time as it is determined that
he is fit to proceed," and that he be committed to the State Secured Medical Facility.
(R., p.495-96.) At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State stipulated that "from

the time Mr. Brown was arrested until the time of that order of commitment, Mr. Brown
was not given any psychotropic medications, nor was he given any mental health
counseling during that period of time." (Tr., p.383, Ls.1-6.)
The State presented no evidence in opposing Mr. Brown's motion or in support of
its assertion that any statements obtained by officers following Mr. Brown's arrest were
made voluntarily, nor did it present any evidence concerning the circumstances under

This motion is in Volume 8 of the nine volumes prepared in response to Mr. Brown's
objection to the record.
25
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which the statements were obtained. (Tr., p.377, L.5 - p.395, L.16.) The State merely
argued,
So our position is that there's nothing in the record, to indicate that the
statements that he made to Detective Long and/or others in the state of
Florida meet anybody's definition of involuntary. And in fact there's because it's factual. There's never been a claim that he was not advised
of his rights. He acknowledged his - during those interviews that he had
numerous experiences, not only of his own with the criminal justice
system, the rights of defendants, et cetera, but also based on his own
legal training and his own paralegal services, had assisted others in
interpreting rights under the law. So Mr. Brown is actually in a very unique
position to maybe understand his situation and his rights more than almost
anybody we've ever dealt with.
(Tr., p.388, L.16

p.389, L.6.)

In denying Mr. Brown's motion, the district court explained,
The result of the commitment proceeding was that - a conclusion, after
some considerable time spent with Mr. Brown, that he was competent,
was able to assist in his own defense. All parties have proceeded since
that order - or that report was issued on the basis that he is competent
and is able to participate in his own defense, that there was no objection
by anyone to the report from the - the 18-210/211 report concluding that
he was competent - or claiming that he was not competent to proceed.
And it seems to me like it's a little bit late now, well after that hearing, to in
effect claim that conclusions reached that he is competent were improper.
Certainly it's been my observation that, particularly since [defense
counsel] has been involved in the case, that Mr. Brown has been actively
participating in his defense as witnesses by the hearing that we had just a
little over a week ago where Mr. Brown was certainly able to assist in - in
some of the issues that - the legal issue that were being raised, not simply
factual issues, but legal issues.
Accordingly, the - any statements that he made to law enforcement
agencies were not rendered involuntary based upon any claim of a mental
health deficiency.
(Tr., p.393, L.18 - p.394, L.17.) The district court made no findings of fact with respect
to the circumstances surrounding the taking of custodial statements from Mr. Brown,
including whether he was advised of his Miranda rights, the length of any questioning,
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whether he was offered meal or bathroom breaks, or any of the other circumstances
that are relevant to the voluntariness determination.
Mr. Brown asserts that the district court erred when it concluded that his
statements were voluntarily made in the absence of any evidence establishing the
circumstances under which those statements were obtained.

As it was the State's

burden to establish - by a preponderance of the evidence - the voluntariness of those
statements, and the State presented no evidence concerning the circumstances under
which the statements were obtained, the district court erred by denying Mr. Brown's
motion to suppress those statements. As such, he respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the district court's order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this matter
for entry of an order suppressing all statements made while he was in custody.26

IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Brown's Request To
Present Testimony At The Hearing On His Rule 35 Motion, And When It Denied His
Motion Without Considering The New Information He Provided In Support
Mr. Brown asserts that the district court abused its discretion by unduly narrowing
the scope of that discretion when it refused to allow him to testify or present witnesses
in support of his Rule 35 motion at the hearing held on that motion, and when it denied
his motion without considering the new information he provided in support. In refusing
to allow the presentation of testimony or evidence in support of the motion, the district
court reasoned:
The request for additional evidence is discretionary with the Court. When
I think back on the case and we had a number of hearings in Sandpoint,
pretrial hearings, Mr. Brown was quite prolific in his written documents
As a result of prevailing on this issue, Mr. Brown would then have the opportunity,
pursuant to the terms of his Rule 11 plea agreement, to move to withdraw his guilty
pleas and proceed to trial on the original charges.
26
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submitted to the Court[27] and to everyone else. We had a mediation, a
plea, Alford plea, after the mediation. We had the presentence report
prepared and had the sentencing hearing with the full opportunity to call
any witnesses who might have something relevant to say at the
sentencing hearing.
It doesn't seem to me that - that there is much to be gained here by
calling a pathologist, a firearms expert, and a polygrapher. And as far as
those - any testimony from those people would go to the - seems to me
would go to issues of guilt, innocence or guilt, and that was taken care of
when we took the plea.
And as far as Mr. Brown is concerned, he had the opportunity, as I stated,
and he submitted reams and reams of written material.[28] So I think that
anything he's had to present to the Court has been presented. So I'm
going to exercise my discretion and deny the request for additional [sic]
testimony.
(Supp.Tr., p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.17.) In denying the Rule 35 motion, the district court
concluded, "in looking back on it and thinking about all that was presented back at the
time of sentencing and prior thereto, the sentence that I imposed, I think, is the correct
one. And I'm not going to modify that sentence." (Supp.Tr., p.13, Ls.14-18.)
It has long been held that a district court abuses its discretion when it "unduly
limits the information to be considered in deciding a Rule 35 motion." State v. James,
112 Idaho 239, 242 (Ct. App. 1986) (citing State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895 (Ct. App.
1984)). In Torres, the Court of Appeals confronted a situation in which the district court
judge who denied the Rule 35 motion refused to allow Torres to present a social
worker's evaluation, prepared after he was sentenced, in support of that motion. The
district court excluded the report in part because he felt "constrained to consider only
the information available to the prior judge when the sentence was imposed."

In

reversing the denial of the Rule 35 motion, the Court of Appeals explained, "[i]t would ill

27 The district court was likely referring to the numerous pro se motions filed by
Mr. Brown which the district court previously announced that it would not consider.
(Tr., p.42, Ls.11-20.)
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serve the purpose of a Rule 35 motion to preclude the defendant from presenting fresh
information about himself or his circumstances." Because the Court of Appeals did not
know how the excluded report might have affected the district court's ruling on the Rule
35 motion, it remanded the matter to the district court for reconsideration in light of the
excluded report. Torres, 107 Idaho at 898.
Here, as in Torres, the district court held that it would consider only information
presented to it at, and before, sentencing. The district court refused to allow Mr. Brown
to testify or present any witnesses in support of his Rule 35 motion. While the district
court did not have to exercise its discretion and hold a hearing on the Rule 35 motion,
once it held a hearing, it could not unduly narrow its own discretion at that hearing.
Furthermore, the district court's reference only to information presented at sentencing
and before sentencing demonstrates that it did not consider the new information
submitted by Mr. Brown in support of his Rule 35 motion. In doing so, the district court
abused its discretion, and the proper remedy is for this Court to vacate the order
denying Mr. Brown's Rule 35 motion and remand this matter for a new Rule 35 hearing
at which Mr. Brown and his witnesses can testify and at which the new information filed
in support of his Rule 35 motion will be considered.

v.
Mindful Of This Court's Holding In State v. Manzanares, The District Court Erred When
It Denied Mr. Brown's Motion To Dismiss Based On Lack Of Probable Cause At
Preliminary Hearing
Mindful of this Court's holding in State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410 (2012), that
when a charge has been dismissed pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence at a preliminary hearing on such a charge are moot for
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See note 4, supra.
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purposes of appeal, Mr. Brown nevertheless asserts that the district court erred when it
denied his Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Probable Cause at Preliminary
Hearing. 29

VI.
Mindful Of The Inapplicability Of The Federal Rules Of Criminal Procedure And 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (c) In A State Prosecution, The District Court Erred When It Denied
Mr. Brown's Motion To Suppress Statements Obtained In Violation Of Those Provisions
Mr. Brown filed a motion to suppress statements following his arrest in Florida as
having been obtained in violation of Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (c). (Motion to Suppress: Presentment to Magistrate; Involuntary
Confession; Dissipation of Probable Cause; Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Suppress: Presentment to Magistrate; Involuntary Confession; and Dissipation of
Probable Cause, pp.2-4.) The district court denied that motion. (R., p.923.)
Mindful of the inapplicability of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18
U.S.C. § 3501(c) to a state prosecution,30 Mr. Brown asserts that the district court erred

In Mr. Brown's case, the charges at issue in the motion were replaced by lesser
charges in the form of an amended information. However, in arguing this motion,
defense counsel maintained, "This type of killing at most was a voluntary
manslaughter," (Defendant's Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Dismiss Based
on Lack of Probable Cause at Preliminary Hearing, Miscellaneous Exhibits, Vo1.2), and
that he was at most an "accessory after the fact" for the charge of grand theft.
(Tr., p.64, L.25 - p.65, L.6.) In light of the fact that Mr. Brown pleaded guilty to
voluntary manslaughter and accessory to grand theft (Tr., p.395, L.14 - p.405, L.16),
this issue is likely moot, under Manzanares, for purposes of this appeal. Assuming that
is the case, Mr. Brown maintains that he retains the right to re-raise the issue in a future
appeal if he is convicted of the greater charges in a future trial in this matter.
30 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide, "These rules govern the procedure
in all criminal proceedings in the United States district courts, the United States courts
of appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States." F.R.C.P. 1(a)(1). 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (c) begins with the language, "In any criminal prosecution by the United
States or by the District of Columbia .... " 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c).
29

29

when it denied his motion to suppress statements obtained in violation of those
provisions.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the orders denying the motions discussed herein, along with the judgment of
conviction entered following his conditional guilty pleas, and remand this matter to the
district court for entry of appropriate orders granting those motions, as well as a hearing
at which Mr. Brown can decide whether to withdraw his guilty pleas. In the alternative, if
this Court denies Mr. Brown's appeals from the denial of his pre-trial motions, he
respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for a new Rule 35 hearing, at
which the new information provided in support of his Rule 35 motion can be considered
by the district court.
DATED this 18th day of July, 2012.
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